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AGENCY-MASTER AND SERVANT-LIABILITY OF MASTER FOR INJURY TO INFANT
VOLUNTEEm-The driver of the defendant's three-horse van, without authority to
hire servants for the master, requested the plaintiff, a fourteen-year old boy, to
assist him. The plaintiff was injured by one of the horses and brought an action
for personal injuries. Held, that the plaintiff could not recover, although the
driver was negligent in intrusting the handling of the horses to him, since the
latter was in no better position than a hired servant. Heasmer v. Pickfords, Ltd.
(i92o, K. B.) 36 T. L. R. 818.
The view is well settled in England, that a volunteer, as regards the master's
liability towards him, is in the same position as if he were a servant, and assumes
all the ordinary risks of service, including that of negligence of a fellow servant.
Degg v. Midland Ry. (I857, Exch.) i H. & N. 773; Pollock, Torts (9th ed. 1912)
IO6-7. But a master will be liable to a volunteer who assists in the use of an
instrumentality not fit and proper for its purpose. See Bass v. Hendon Urban
District Council (i912, C. A.) 28 T. L. R. 317. Some duty of the master to in-
struct an infant servant in the use of dangerous instrumentalities, is recognized
though it is capable of being delegated. Cribb v. Kynock [1907] 2 K. B. 548;
Young v. Hoffman Mfg. Co. [1907] 2 K. B. 646. Minor servants assume only
those risks pointed out to them or discernible by a person of their age, capacity,
and experience, in the exercise of ordinary care. 4 Thompson, Negligence (2d
ed. I9O4) sec. 4685; I Bailey, Personal Injuries (2d ed. 1912) 681. If the boy is
in the position of a servant so as to bar recovery for the driver's negligence, he
should be in the position of a servant as regards the master's duty to see that a
minor servant is properly instructed. But no point was made in the instant case
of the failure to warn and instruct. The majority of the workmen's compensation
acts cannot help a volunteer, for besides depending, usually, on contract, express
or implied, they exclude casual employees from their operation. 2o Halsbury,
Laws of England (1911) secs. 326-330; 3 Bailey, Personal Injuries (2d ed. 1912)
see. 871 ff. (text of American acts) ; see State v. District Court (1917) 138 Minn.
416, 165 N. W. 268 (emergency); also (1917) 27 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 571. In
the United States, at common law, a volunteer is not at all on the footing of a
servant, for the relation lacks the consent of the master, and such a person
assumes all the risks of the situation, save that of wanton or wilful injury, not
merely all the ordinary risks. Hot Springs Ry. v. Dial (1893) 58 Ark. 318, 24
S. W. 5oo; Hunter v. Corrigan (igo9) 139 Ky. 315, 122 S. W. 131; 43 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 187, note. See also (1917) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, io86. Age and mental
capacity are then irrelevant inquiries. Atlanta & W. P. Ry. v. West (igo5) 121
Ga. 641, 49 S. E. 711; cf. Wells v. Kentucky Distilleries Co. (i911) 144 Ky. 438,
138 S. W. 278 (ratio analogous to attractive nuisance cases). However, the ten-
dency in the United States is to permit recovery by a volunteer who acts toprevent
possible injury to property or persons as a result of a defendant's negligence.
See (1917) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 96o. The plaintiff's act in the instant case
was a little less commendable. The decision in the instant case is in accord with
the great majority of the English and American cases, though it seems hijhly
artificial to base it on the doctrine of common employment. Both the English
and American views are, it would seem, unsatisfactory in their result to society.
CONmACTs-ILt.EGAI.rTY-TRANSFER OF TiTLE WITHOUT DELVERY OF PossEs-
sioN.-The plaintiff built a house and sold it to the defendant for immoral
purposes, taking notes and a deed of trust in payment. After payment of
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some of the notes. default was made and the property sold under the deed of
trust to the plaintiff, who, upon the defendant's refusal to surrender possession,
brought trespass to try title. Held, that the sale by the trustee executed the con-
tract so that the plaintiff was entitled to his remedy. Hall v. Edwards (192,
Tex. Com. App.) 222 S. W. 167.
Before the sale by the trustee the plaintiff was without remedy. In cases of
illegal leases or conditional sales some courts have allowed the lessor or the
vendor to recover his goods upon non-payment. Case v. Monk (913) 7 Ala.
App 419, 62 So. 268. Other courts have not allowed recovery. Phillp Levy &
Co. v. Dazis (1914) 115 Va. 814, 8o S. E. 79i. But where the complete title has
passed the cases are nearly uniform in not allowing the vendor to recover his
property. St. Louis, V. & T. H. Ry. v. Terre Haute & L Ry. (1892) 145 U. S.
393, 12 Sup. Ct. 953; Roy v. Harvey Peak Tin Mine, Milling & Mfg. Co. (i9o6)
21 S. D. 14o, i1o N. W. io6. And this rule applies although the transferee has
but partly performed. Perkins v. Savage (1836, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 15 Wend. 412.
In the instant case the conveyance to the vendee has been executed; and a second
sale has taken place by the trustee to the plaintiff, after which the court will en-
force the plaintiff's rights if such sale executes the contract. St. Louis, V. & T.
H. R. Co. v. Terre Haute & I. R. Co., supra. The question, therefore, in the
instant case is whether the contract has been executed by this second sale by the
trustee before the plaintiff has regained possession from the vendee. Where a
deed has been made to defraud creditors, the grantor remaining in possession, a
majority of courts will not sustain the grantee's action of ejectment. Harrison
v. Ha!cher (1872) 44 Ga. 638; Kirkpatrick v. Clark (1890) 132 Ill. 342, 24 N. E.
71; contra, Mosely v. Mosely (1857) I5 N. Y. 334; Raguet v..Roll (1836) 7 Ohio,
Part 2, 7o. In the instant case the parties are reversed, and the original grantor
is seeking relief ; considerations of sentiment would aid the plaintiff, but decisions
as to illegal contracts should be divorced of sentiment. Cf. Deans v. McLendon
(i855) 3o Miss. 343. Courts differ as to when an illegal contract is executed, and
therefore it seems likely that no uniformity of decision will result in cases raising
this question.
CONTRACTS-UNCERTAINTY OF TERms-PoMISE OF A "LIBERAL AND VERY SUB-
STANTIAL BoNus."--The plaintiff brought an action on a contract by the terms of
which the defendant promised to pay him $25o.oo a month with "a liberal and
very substantial bonus" in addition. The plaintiff was paid only the monthly
salary, and he sought to recover 5 per cent. of the receipts as a bonus. Held,
that the contract as to the bonus was so indefinite and uncertain as not to be
enforceable. McDonald v. Acker, Merrall & Condit Co. (i92o, App. Div.) 182
N. Y, Supp. 6o7.
Where no statement is made as to compensation for services, the law invokes
the standard of reasonableness, and the fair value of the services is recoverable
in an action on the contract. Rowell v. Ross (1913) 87 Conn. 157, 87 AtI. 355.
If, however, the terms of the promise mention some remuneration, but do not
indicate the specific compensation the promisee is to receive, and the words used
exclude the supposition that reasonable remuneration is intended, no contract
can arise. Butler v. Keminerer (1907) 218 Pa. 242, 67 Atl. 332 (promise to divide
profits on a liberal basis). But if a benefit is conferred in the honest, though
mistaken, belief that such a promise is binding, a recovery will be allowed on a
quantum meruit. Bluemner v. Garvin (19o7) 12D App..Div. 29, 1O4 N. Y. Supp.
ioog (promise of a fair share of the profits). However, if the terms of a
promise indicate that the promisee did not rely on it as a contractual obligation,
but trusted to the fairness and liberality of the defendant, there is not only no
contract, but no reliance on a ,supposed contract, and consequently no legal duty
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on the defendant whatever. Woodward, The Law of Quasi Contracts (913)
sec. 65; x Williston, Contracts (i92o) 82, note 53. It seems that the principal
case falls under the last proposition named. The provision for a specific monthly
salary excludes the probability that the bonus was intended as compensation and
indicates that the plaintiff was relying on the defendant's fairness and liberality.
This gives rise to only a moral obligation, and the principal case seems correct in
refusing a recovery. However, if the plaintiff can show a custom that a certain
percentage was usually paid as a bonus in those trades, and that the parties had
such a custom in mind when entering into the agreement, then it is probable that
a recovery would be allowed on the contract. See Varney v. Ditmars (1916)
217 N. Y. 223, 233, 1ir. N. E. 822, 826.
EQurry-INjuNcno-ERROR To ENJoIN CAsE oN APPEA.-A lessor sued a
tenant for rent due from a subtenant who remained in possession after the end
of the term. Because of the small judgment, he appealed to the circuit court and
simultaneously brought another action for later rent, but before either the appeal
or the new case had been tried, the tenant perpetually enjoined him from bringing
any more suits and also from further prosecuting the case pending an appeal.
Held, that the chancellor erred in enjoining the lessor from proceeding with the
appeal and should have only enjoined later actions until the termination of the
first. Kansas City Breweries Co. v. Markowitz (192, Mo. App.) 221 S. W. 398.
There is no authority for restraining an action at law in which all issues may be
fully determined nor for enjoining a case on appeal. Fraley & Carey vu. Delmont
(i9o6) iio App. Div. 468, 97 N. Y. Supp. 4o8; Galey v. Montgomery Co. (I9Io)
174 Ind. I8I, 91 N. E. 593; Judicature Act (1873) 33 & 37 Vict. c. 66. But where
a multiplicity of suits seems threatened, all may be enjoined but one. Cuth-
bert v. Chauvet (i89I, Sup. Ct. Gen. T.) 14 N. Y. Supp. 385; I Pomeroy, Equity
Jurisprudence (4th ed. 1918) sec. 254. And the discretion of the judge alone
apparently decides which of the actions should proceed. See Cuthbert v. Chauvet,
supra, at p. 386. By older and more prevalent practice an injunction would not
be granted restraining successive legal actions unless the plaintiff in equity had
previously successfully defended his case at law. West v. Mayor of N. Y. (1844,
N. Y. Ch.) io Paige, 539; Cleland v. Campbell (1898) 78 IlL App. 624. But by
the more modern Tinority rule an injunction may issue before any suit at law
has been brought. Aimee Realty Co. v. Hailer (1907) 128 Mo. App. 66, io6 S. W.
588; see Galveston etc. Ry. v. Dozwa (1888) 7o Tex. 5, 10, 7 S W. 368, 37o. But
no general rule can be found. Each case rests upon its own merits and the pre-
vention of multiplicity should not be considered more important than the adequacy
of the legal remedy, or suppose all successive actions to be vexatious. Pioneer
Truck Co. v. Clark (i919, Calif.) 186 Pac. 839; I Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence
(4 th ed. ig8) sec. 254 ff.; see Hale v. Allinson (19o2) I88 U. S. 56, 77, 
23 Sup.
Ct. 244, 252. In every case of such an injunction it must be possible to determine
the different suits by the settlement of one or more issues of law or of fact
common to all. St. Louis etc. Ry. Co. v. Woldert (1914, Te. Civ. App.) 162
S. W. 174. The decision in the one suit may be a decision of all, i. e., if a point
of law. Third Ave. R. R. Co. v. Mayor etc. of N. Y. (1873) 54 N. Y. i59. The
injunction, therefore, at the most, merely postpones the time of enforcement of
the demands in issue. Norfolk etc. Hosiery Co. v. Arnold (1894) 143 N. Y. 265,
38 N. E. 21. The principal case seems sound, although its exercise of equitable
jurisdiction is necessarily somewhat unusual, because of circumstantial
limitations.
MumicPAL CORPORATIoNs-LABrrY FoR Tours-DFzcr xx ORiGiNAL PLAN oF
HIGHWAY CommIssioNE-The plaintiff sought damages from the State Highway
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Commissioner for injuries caused when the wheels of his motor truck crushed
through a drain built under the roadway. The highway had been improved pur-
suant to a plan adopted by the Commissioner and a drain placed under the road.
At the place of the accident the drain was covered with gravel a foot in thickness,
which was insufficient to support the weight of the plaintiff's truck. The lower
court found that the Commissioner.had knowledge of the manner of construction
from plans and specifications in his possession, but that he had not been negligent
in failing to keep the road in proper repair. Held, that the Commissioner was
liable, not for any defect in the original plan, but for a continuance of that defect
after notice. Perrotti v. Bennett (192o, Conn.) iog Atl. 8go.
The courts have generally accepted the rule that municipal corporations or their
officers are not liable for injuries caused through a defect in the original plan of
an improvement where the defect arises through an error in judgment. 4 Dillon,
Municipal Corporations, (5th ed., 1911) sec. 1626. In making shch an improve-
ment the corporation is exercising a discretionary and legislative power. 6 Mc-
Quillin, Municipal Corporations (1913) sec. 2633. But where the defect has arisen
through plans negligently adopted and is not the result of a mere error in judg-
ment, there is liability. North Vernon v. Voegler (1885) 1O3 Ind. 314, 2 N. E.
821; Kelsey v. New York (io8) 123 App. Div. 381, lO7 N. Y. Supp. iO89. In
numerous cases regarding defects in sewers and drains which have caused a direct
invasion of the plaintiff's real property or have constituted a nuisance, the courts
have held that there was liability for a defective plan, placing emphasis upon the
idea that there had been a direct trespass upon the plaintiff's land. King v.
Kansas City (1897) 58 Kans. 334, 49 Pac. 88; Ashley v. Port Huron (1877) 35
Mich. 296; contra, Buckley v. New Bedford (i8gi) 155 Mass. 64, 29 N. E. 2oI.
Notice of the defective plan is generally said to be a condition precedent to lia-
bility, for not until after notice does there arise a duty to remedy the defect.
Seifert v. Brooklyn (i886) ioi N. Y. 136, 4 N. E. 321; Stoddard v. Winchester
(1891) 154 Mass. 149, 27 N. E. 1oi4. But if the defect is inherent in the plan,
this fact is sometimes held operative in place of actual notice. Hart v. Neillsville
(19o9) 141 Wis, 3, 123 N. W. 125. The Connecticut statute imposes liability only
for a neglect to repair. Conn. Rev. St. 1918 sec. 414. See Hoyt v. Danbury
(1897) 69 Conn. 341, 351, 37 AtL 1051, 1054. In the instant case the court
held that the drain constituted a defect from the time it was laid, and that the
continuance of the defect was such a failure to keep the road in proper repair,
as placed liability upon the commissioner.
PERSONS-MARRIAGE-ANNULMENT FOR FRAUD BEFORE CONSUMMATIoN.-The
petitioner, a young girl, sued to annul a marriage for misrepresentations by the
defendant regarding his moral character and habits. The marriage was not
consummated and was promptly disaffirmed by her on discovery of the fraud.
Held, that the marriage might be annulled. Ysern v. Horter (192o, N. 3. Eq.)
II0 At. 31.
As a general rule, habits and character are not held such an essential of the
marital relation that a misrepresentation regarding them is ground for annul-
ment. iS R. C. L. 414. It is against public policy to declare children illegitimate
and destroy the home for such cause. See Fessenden, Nullity of Marriage
(I899) 13 HARV. L. REV. 110, 112. But, in the instant case, the court makes a
distinction, not generally recognized, between consummated and unconsummated
marriages. i Bishop, Marriage and Divorce (6th ed. 1881) secs. 166, 172;
Wier v. Still (1870) 31 Iowa, 1o7. In this case there is no possibility of children,
and the parties have not actively entered into the marriage relation. Their
status is similar to that of parties to an executory contract. 19 Am. & Eng.
Encyc. 1184. Fraud is not a cause of divorce. See Henneger v. Lomas (I896)
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145 Ind. 287, 297, 44 N. E. 462, 465. And annulment is therefore a necessary
remedy, as it would seem contrary to public policy to condemn the defrauded
party to a perpetual and unhappy association with the wrongdoer. See Robert-
son v. Cole (1854) 12 Tex. 356, 364. It appears impossible to form a definite
rule for a question so complicated by particular circumstances. See I Black-
stone, Commentaries (Cooley's 2d ed. 1872) 438, note. But the differences between
marriage and other contracts are due to the great importance of the marriage
relation itself. Cf. 18 R. C. L. 385; Randall v. Kreiger (1874) 90 U. S. 137,
147; Maynard v. Hill (1888) 125 U. S. 190, 205, 8 Sup. Ct. 723, 726. And,
under the circumstances of the instant case it seems sound to hold the marriage
voidable for such fraud as would render a contract voidable. The decision
appears to tend to improve the marriage status more than to endanger its
permanence, but the rule should be carefully limited.
PaRSoNs-HusBAND AND WIr-ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS-SEPARATION NO
DEFrNsE.-The plaintiff, a married woman, sued another woman for the aliena-
tion of her husband's affections. The declaration set forth an interference by
the defendant with the marital relation while husband and wife were living
together, and a wilful continuance of that influence after they had separated.
The plaintiff's request to instruct the jury that separation or unhappiness
between husband and wife was no defense to the action was refused. Held,
that such instruction should have been given. Dey v. Dey (I920, N. J. Sup. Ct.)
iio At. 703.
At common law it was well settled that a wife could not maintain an action
for the alienation of her husband's affections, because the husband by virtue of
his position would be joined as party plaintiff, and recover damages for his
own wrong. See Haynes v. Nowlin (i8gi) 129 Ind. 581, 584, 29 N. E. 389, 390;
(I918) 32 HARv. L. REV. 576. In most jurisdictions, however, the enactment
of Married Women's Property Acts has been held to create in the wife a right
to sue for alienation of affections. Haynes v. Nowlin, supra. The mere
alienation of affections, unaccompanied by adultery, enticing, or procuring, has
been held to be insufficient to maintain the action. Houghton v. Rice (1899)
174 Mass. 366, 54 N. E. 843. The weight of authority, however, permits the
plaintiff to recover for the mere alienation of the spouse's affections. Adams
v. Main (1892) 3 Ind. App. 232, 29 N. E. 792; Rineharit v. Bills (1884) 82 Mo.
534, 52 Am. Rep. 385. The decisions are not agreed as to whether evidence of
a lack of conjugal affection at the time of the defendant's interference is a
bar to the action. A few jurisdictions refuse to recognize the defendant's
duty not to hinder, under the circumstances, the possibility of reconciliation
between husband and wife. Servis v. Servis (19o2) 172 N. Y. 438, 65 N. E.
27o; Hall v. Smith (1913) 8o Misc. Rep. 85, 14o N. Y. Supp. 796. The prin-
cipal case is in line with the majority rule in holding that a blameless spouse,
after separation, has a right against interference with the marital relationship
by the defendant, and that a lack of affections, or a separation, affects only the
question of damages. Moelleur v. Moelleur (igi) 55 Mont. 30, 173 Pac. 419.
Where, however, the plaintiff's own infidelity or cruelty is the moving cause of
the separation, the other spouse is privileged to live apart. Rodgers v. Rodgers
(1920, N. Y.) 128 N. E. 117. And it follows that under those circumstances the
defendant's acts would also be privileged. Smith v. Rice (1916) 178 Ia. 673,
i6o N. W. 6. See (1918) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 88.
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS-IMPLIED POWERS-GUARANTY OF CUSTOMER'S INDEBTED-
NESS.-The defendant corporation was chartered to "deal in lumber and other
building materials both at wholesale and retail, and generally to do and perform
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all matters and things incident or necessary in such business." 'The defendant
corporation became surety on a building contractor's bond, and he promised to
buy the materials for the building from it. This was an action on the bond.
Held, that the plaintiff should not recover, because this was an indirect method
of fostering the defendant's business, and hence ultra tires. Bowman Lumber
Co. v. Pierson (x92o, Tex.) 221 S. W. 930.
It is a well-settled general rule that in addition to its express powers a cor-
poration has the implied powers to do whatever is reasonably adapted to
further the enterprise for which it was chartered. There are various tests for
determining whether a certain act by a business corporation, calculated to foster
its business, is ultra vires. In the instant case the court requires such act to be
a direct attempt to secure business. In a case involving identical facts the
Supreme Court of Washington held the question to be one of business custom
and found that the custom on Puget Sound at that time made it necessary for
a lumber corporation to guarantee the bonds of contractors in order to secure
their business, because non-corporate lumber companies customarily did so.
Wheeler, Osgood & Co. v. Everett Land Co. (1896) 14 Wash. 630, 45 Pac. 316.
The power of business corporations to enter into contracts of suretyship for
the benefit of customers or prospective customers has frequently been upheld.
27 L. R. A. (N. S.) i86, note. The question has been most frequently adjudi-
cated where a brewery corporation has signed the lease or bond of a saloon
keeper in exchange for his promise to sell only the products sold by the cor-
poration. Such contracts of guaranty are generally held valid. Timm v. Grand
Rapids Brewing Co. (191o) i6o Mich. 371, 125 N. W. 357; Miller v. Northern
Brewing Co. (I917, D. Ore.) 242 Fed. 164; Holm v. Claus Lipsius Brewing Co.
(1897) 21 App. Div. 204, 47 N. Y. Supp. 518. It is sometimes said that where
the special circumstances make it reasonably necessary for the corporation to
guarantee its customers' indebtedness it has power to do so. So a corporation
authorized to own -patents and license their use can become surety for a licensee
of its patents in order to tide the licensee over a period of depression. Edwards
v. International Pavement Co. (1917) 227 Mass. 2o6, 116 N. E. 266. But it is
submitted that this calls for no more than an investigation as to the business
custom. "The objection to the guaranty is that it risks the funds of the company
in a different enterprise and business under the control of another and different
person or corporation, contrary to what its stockholders, its creditors, and the
state have the right from its charter to expect." See Humboldt Min. Co. v.
American Manufacturing, Mining & Milling Co. (1894, C. C. A. 6th) 62 Fed.
356, 362. But it is also to the interest of each of these parties that the corpora-
tion be financially successful, and it should therefore be allowed to meet com-
petition of non-corporate companies by doing those things which business custom
dictates.
SAus---"C. I. F." CONTRACTS--RsSIC OF SHIPMENT ON THE Buyvm-The
plaintiff shipped to the defendant 325 drums of fish under a contract calling
for io25 drums "c. i. f." ("cost, insurance, and freight") Philadelphia. Imme-
diately after shipment the plaintiff forwarded to a bank in Philadelphia the
insurance policy, the invoice and a through bill of lading, all indorsed in blank
and attached to a sight draft on the defendant. The ship was sunk two days
after shipment and the goods were totally destroyed. The bill of lading and
the sight draft were duly tendered to the defendant after the destruction of the
cargo, but he refused to accept the draft or pay any part thereof, whereupon this
suit was instituted for the value of the shipment. Held, that the plaintiff should
recover. Smith & Co. v. Marano (i92o, Pa.) iO Atl. 94.
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Under the Sales Act, sec. ig, rule 5, when the seller is to pay the freight to
the buyer or to a particular place, title does not pass until the goods reach their
destination, unless a different intention appears. See Woodward, Cases on Sales
(1913) 758. In the instant case, the court held that procurement by the seller
of insurance for the benefit of the buyer, as is the case in a normal "c. i. f."
contract, was enough to show a different intention. There are almost no
American cases on the point, because "c. i. f." clauses have not until recently
been used in our sales contracts. The English authorities are overwhelmingly
in favor of the proposition that under a "c. i. f." shipment, title passes to the
buyer immediately on delivery to the carrier. Karberg v. Blythe [1916, C. A.]
I K. B. 495; Biddell v. E. Clemens Horst Co. [1911] I K. B. 214. The few
American courts that have decided this point also hold that title and risk pass
to the buyer immediately on the delivery to the carrier. Mee v. McNider
(I888) io9 N. Y. 5o% 17 N. E. 424; see Thames & Mersey Insurance Co; v.
U. S. (1915) 237 U. S. 19, 26, 35 Sup. Ct. 496, 498. A recent English case held
that under a "c. i. f." contract even after the safe arrival of the goods, the
buyer was not bound to accept them because the seller had not insured them.
Orient Co. v. Brekke [1913] 1 K. B. 531, Ann. Cas. 1914 C, 214, note. The
policy of insurance is considered an essential item in these cases. Yuill & Co.
v. Robson [19o7, Com. Ct.] I K. B. 685; Landauer v. Craven [1912] 2 K. B.
94. The reasoning of the court in the instant case, that if the buyer had no
property in the goods during shipment, he surely would not have been concerned
with any stipulations regarding insurance, is very forceful; and it will be of
interest to note its effect on the future American cases involving such contracts.
SALES-CoNDITIONAL VENDOR-RIGHTS IN AUTOMOBILE FORFEITED BECAUSE OF
TRANSPORTATION OF INTOXICATING LIQuoR.-The plaintiff had put an automobile
into the possession of one Haygood under a conditional sales contract. The
automobile was seized by the state under a statute similar to the Volstead Act,
while in the possession of Haygood, because it was used in the illegal trans-
portation of prohibited liquors. The plaintiff showed that the purchase money
had not been paid and demanded the return of the car. Held, that the plaintiff
should recover. Flint Motor Car Co. v. State (ig2o, Ala.) 85 So. 74r.
In order to recover in the jurisdictions which are in accord with the instant
case, it is agreed that the conditional vendor must be innocent of knowledge
of the use to which the vehicle has been put. He has the burden of proving
such innocence, but he is not an insurer against the illegal use. State v. Davis
(igig, Utah) I84 Pac. 161; Mays v. Curry (1920, Ga.) 1o3 S. E. 458. There is
serious conflict with the instant case in other jurisdictions which have similar
statutes. It is there maintained that the innocence of the conditional vendor
is immaterial. His rights are subordinate to the right of the state to seize the
machine. Pennington v. Commonwealth (I920, Va.) 102 S. E. 758. If the
person found with the car obtained possession of it lawfully, it is subject to
forfeiture, even though his continued possession is wrongful and he has thereby
become a thief. Buchqlz v. Commonwealth (192o, Va.) io2 S. E. 76o. It is
generally conceded that if the car has been taken from the owner's possession,
without his knowledge or consent, he may recover it. Smith v. Spencer-Dowler
Co. (igig, Ga.) ioo S. E. 651; see Bucholz v. Commonwealth, supra, at p. 761.
The question has not yet been decided by the Supreme Court of the United
States, but by the analogy to the smuggling cases, authority can be found which
would justify the holding that the "due process" clause is not being i iolated
by such seizures. United States v. One Saxon Automobile (Igig, C. C. A. 4th)
257 Fed. 251. It is submitted that the instant case followed the more expedient
rule. It is impossible for a conditional vendor to determine the use to which
YALE LAW JOURNAL
an automobile is to be put, once it has left his hands. Consequently, the other
rule would seriously interfere with the conditional sale of automobiles. Sales
of this kind have become so widespread that such interference would work
undue hardship upon the public in general, and particularly upon automobile
dealers and banks who make loans upon such security. Furthermore, by placing
the burden of proving innocence upon the plaintiff, any advantage which might
be given to illicit dealers is offset and there is no serious hindrance to the
enforcement of the prohibition statutes.
TORTS-AsSAULT-SURGICAL OPERATION ON MINOR WITHOUT CONSENT- OF
PARENT.--The plaintiff sued the defendant under a "Wrongful Death Act"
for the death of his eleven-year-old daughter caused by an operation performed
without his consent. The daughter, in the temporary custody of her adult
sister, was brought to the defendant, who performed an operation, for the
removal of diseased tonsils and adenoids, which resulted in her death while
under the influence of the anaesthetic. Held, that the plaintiff should recover,
because there was no evidence showing the immediate need of the operation,
and because the operation amounted to an assault for which the child could have
recovered had she survived. Moss et al. v. Rishworth (192o, Tex. Cbm. App.)
222 S. W. 225.
There is a scarcity of authority on the particular point in question, but the
general proposition is that a surgeon is under a duty not to operate on a patient
without his consent, express or implied. Mohr v. Williams (19o5) 95 Minn.
261, io4 N. W. 12, I L. R. A. (N. S.) 439, note; Pratt v. Davis (i9o6) 224 Ill.
300, 79 N. E. 562, 8 Ann. Cas. 197, note. Generally an operation on an infant
requires the consent of the parent as well as that of the infant. 21 R. C. L. 393.
There is a case, however, where the court held that consent of the parent was
not necessary, but that the infant's consent alone was sufficient. Bakker v.
Welsh (i9o6) r44 Mich. 632, iO8 N. W. 94, 8 Ann. Cas. 195, note. The court,
in this case, based its decision chiefly on the fact that the parent could easily
have been presumed to have knowledge of the operation, as the child went home
for a few days between the consultation with the surgeon and the day of the
operation. The fact that the infant was seventeen years of age and therefore
mentally competent to decide, was also mentioned as a ground for its decision.
There is an analogous case where it was held that a husband's consent was not
necessary in a suit under a "Wrongful Death Act" for performing an opera-
tion on his wife, who was mentally competent to decide, without his consent.
State v. Housekeeper (1889) 7o Md. 162, 6 AtI. 382. But see also Pratt v.
Davis, supra. It does not follow that an infant's consent is sufficient even
where such infant is mentally competent to decide, as the distinction between
the relationships is obvious. There is, however, one class of cases where it
has been held that a surgeon may perform an operation on an infant without
the parent's consent, namely where an immediate operation is necessary to save
the infant's life. Luka v. Lowrie (19iz) 171 Mich. 122, 136 N. W. iio6. In
cases of this kind the courts, chiefly on the grounds of public policy, "imply"
the parent's consent. The fact that the operation was a minor one and that
the father was easily accessible, confirms the correctness of the instant case.
The surgeon could easily have waited till the parent's consent was obtained
without endangering the infant's life in the least.
TORTS-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE-ANIMALS ON RAILROADS AND HIGHWAYS.-
The plaintiff's mule was struck by one of the defendant's engines in a juris-
diction where neither railroads nor cattle owners are under a duty to fence their
lands. The engine, equipped with an electric headlight, was on a straight track,
and the mules could have been seen by the engine crew if they had kept a
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lookout. It appeared that the fireman called to the engineer that they were
about to run into some stock, and the latter slackened his speed until a mule
was seen to leave the track, when steam was again turned to the engine. An
action was brought to recover for the death of a mule which was struck. Held,
that the plaintiff should recover, and that the amount of damages should not 
be
reduced in the proportion in which the act of the animal contributed 
to the
injury, because the comparative negligence statute had no application to 
injury
to personal property. Henderson & Mathis v. Hine (192o, Miss.) 83 So. 58g.
By what seems the weight of authority, it is the duty of those in charge 
of
locomotives to keep a reasonable lookout for live stock on or near the 
tracks,
not merely to exercise care after discovery to prevent injury thereto. 
Mobile
and G. R. R. v. Caldwell (i888) 83 Ala. 196, 3 So. 445; Gulf, etc., R. R. 
v. Wash-
ington (i892, C. C. A. 8th) 49 Fed. 347; see 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 858, 
note.
This seems to be the better rule, certainly where the presence of animals 
is to be
anticipated, as where fields are unfenced. Greater liability is imposed 
if the
animal is led to the track by attractive substances negligently exposed. 
Crafton
v. Hannibal & St. Joseph R. R. (1874) 55 Mo. 580; Page v. North 
Carolina
R. R. (1874) 71 N. C. 222. But the railroad's first duty is to 
passengers
and that is paramount to their duty to avoid injury to animals on or 
near the
track. Kirk v. Norfolk & W. R. R. (1896) 41 W. Va. 722, 24 S. E. 639; 
Bemis
v. Conn. & P. R. R. (1869) 42 Vt 375. When animals have been discovered 
in
time to avoid collision, blowing the whistle is not ordinarily enough; 
the train
should be brought to a stop if there is a reasonable apprehension that the 
animal
will stay on, or go upon the track. Grimmell v. Chicago etc. R. R. 
(1887) 73
Iowa 93, 34 N. W. 758; Little Rock etc. R. R. v. Trotter (1881) 37 
Ark. 593.
It is a matter of common experience that such classes of personal 
property as
dogs and fowl will generally hurry to safety on the mere blowing 
of a whistle.
So it is not necessary for the engine to come to a dead stop, where 
such an
animal appears to be able to get off the track. Moore v. Charlotte 
etc. R. R.
(19o4) 136 N. C. 554, 48 S. E. 822; Richardson v. Florida, etc. R. 
R. (i899)
55 S. C. 334, 33 S. E. 466; Lewis v. N. S. R. R. (1913) 163 N. C. 33, 
79 S. E. 283;
contra, James v. A. C. L. R. R. (914) i66 N. C. 572, 82 S. E. io26. The 
duty of
an automobilist in regard to animals in the highway presents. a somewhat 
dif-
ferent question, for he can stop more quickly or swerve to one side of 
the road.
Cf. James v. Railroad, supra. Some jurisdictions have by legislation made 
it a
nuisance per se to allow certain animals at large in the highway, thus 
destroying
this duty to stop. See (i916) 26 YALE LAw JOURNA., :25o; see (I92o) 
29 ibid.,
466. However, the courts uniformly avoid saying that there can be negligence
by animals. They prefer to regard only the amount of fault in the 
defendant,
measured by the intelligence and agility of which each class of animals 
is capable.
ToRT$-NEGLiGENc-BusiNESS VisrroRs-RECOVERY 
BY FIREMAN FOR IN-
jURY-The defendant brewery had constructed across its 
property a paved
driveway leading to a stable in the rear. This driveway was used by the defend-
ant and by those who had business with it. Back one hundred and 
fifty feet
from the street, across half of this pavement, ran an unguarded 
coal hole. The
plaintiff was chief of the local fire department A fire occurred on 
the premises
at night and the plaintiff, while answering the alarm, fell into the coal 
hole and
sustained the injuries for which this action was brought Held, that the 
-plaintiff
should recover, because he had a privilege to be on the premises and 
the de-
fendant owed him a duty to use reasonable care in keeping the premises 
safe.
Hiscock, C. J. Collins and Elkus, J. J. dissenting. Meiers v. Fred Koch 
Brewery
(I92o, N. Y.) 127 N. E. 491.
Persons who enter land on ordinary business at the express or implied 
invita-
tion of the owner have a right to be protected against unsafe conditions 
of the
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premises. Bennett v. Louisville & Nashville Ry. (x88o) io2 U. S. 577; see
(igp8) 27 YALE LAW JouRNAI io86. A more apprdpriate name for these persons
is business visitors. No duty to keep the premises safe is owed to trespassers or
licensees. Cowen v. Kirby (igo2) iSo Mass. 5o4, 62 N. E. 968. It has been gen-
erally held that policemen and firemen are mere licensees. Lunt v. Post Printing
& Pub. Co. (igio) 48 Colo. 316, iio Pac. 2o3 ; see (i918) 27 YALE LAW JouNAL,
415; see 3 Shearman and Redfield, Negligence (6th ed. 1913) 18So; see Cooley,
Torts (3d ed. i9o6) 648. A duty toward them, however, may be imposed on the
owner by statute. Parker v. Barnard (1882) 135 Mass. 116; Drake v. Fenton
(1912) z'37 Pa. 8, 85 Atl. x4. But in the absence of statute the owner of the
premises is under no duty to such persons except to avoid' wilful harm. New
Omaha Electric Light Co. v. Anderson (igo5) 73 Neb. 84, id2 N. W. 89. Thus
the owner is not liable if a fireman falls into an unguarded elevator well or un-
covered air-shaft. Beehler v. Daniels (1894) 18 R. I. 563,'29 AtL 6; Woods v.
Miller (1898) 3o App. Div. 232, 52 N. Y. Supp. 217. There is no duty to pay
damages for injuries received by a policeman in shutting a defective door which
the owner has left open. 'Burroughs Adding Machine Co. v. Fryar (1915) 132
Tenn. 612, 179 S. W. 127. Nor for the death of a policeman who boarded a train
for the purpose of "apprehending criminals." Creeden v. Boston & Maine
R. R. (i9o6) 193 Mass. 28o, 79 N. E. 344. But a policeman who is invited on the
premises to make an arrest is a business visitor and may maintain an action if
he falls into an unguarded well. Learoyd v. Godfrey (i885) 138 Mass. 315;
cf. Cameron v. Commercial Co. (x899) 22 Mont. 312, 56 Pac. 358. However, a
fireman who answers an alarm turned in by the owner is not an invitee of the
owner, as he would have the same privilege to enter the premises had the alarm
been turned in by a stranger. Lunt v. Post Printing & Pub. Co., supra, The
principal case regards it as immaterial whether the plaintiff had an invitation to
come on the defendant's premises or not, holding he entered "as of right." It is
submitted that the decision is clearly contrary to the weight of authority, and has
the effect of imposing upon the owners of property an unreasonable duty in
respect to coal holes, airshafts on the tops of buildings, etc., which they could
not anticipate would ordinarily prove perilous to business visitors; and that the
reasonable claim of the fireman for injury received in the exercise of duty should
be met by governmental insurance of men employed in this perilous work.
ToRTS-NEGLIGENE-PRoximATE CAUSE-INTERVENING RESPONSIBLE AGENT.--
The plaintiff employed the defendant as his confidential agent in financial matters,
and in connection therewith sent him a letter which was libellous of third persons.
Through the negligence of the defendant this letter came into the hands of a
business associate of those who had been libelled, who (although he was told
that it was personal and not to read it) read it and communicated its contents
to them. The latter sued the plaintiff for the publication of the libel to the
defendant and recovered. The plaintiff then sued the defendant for negligence
in permitting the letter to be exposed. The plaintiff was given a judgment for
nominal damages by the Court of Appeals. He then brought this appeal claim-
ing that he was entitled to damages to the full amount recovered against him in
the libel suit, as assessed by the jury in the court of first instance. Held (two
judges dissenting), that the plaintiff could not recover, although the defendant
was negligent, since the voluntary wrongful act of a third person intervened be-
tween the defendant's negligence and the plaintiff's damage. Weld-Blundell v.
Stevens (i92o, H. L.) 36 T. L. R. 640.
The instant case reflects the confusion and narrow points of view which are
found in a great many cases which have involved the question of causation. See
Vicars v. Wilcox (x8o6, K. B.) 8 East, i. Where the intervening act has been
instinctive, the courts have followed the "squib" case. Scott v. Shepherd (I773,
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K. B.) 2 W. Bi. 892; Ricker v. Freeman (1870) So N. H. 42o. Where 
the inter-
vening act was negligent, the defendant is not liable if the later act 
of negligence
could not have been foreseen as a consequence of the defendant's negligence, 
it
being said that the later act of negligence "insulates" that of the defendant.
Harton v. Forest City Telephone Co. (i9o7) 146 N. C. 429, 59 S. E. io2. See
Henry T. Terry, Proximate Consequences in the Law of Torts (1914) 28 
HAv.
L. REv. io. Where, however, the intervening act was a wilful wrong, practically
all courts have exonerated the defendant. Alexander v. Town of New 
Castle
(i888) I15 Ind. 51, 17 N. E. 200; Andrews v. Kinsel (19o) 114 Ga. 39o, 40 S. 
E.
3oo. But a broader view has been taken that the intervening 
act of a third per-
son, whether negligent or wilful, does not necessarily break the causal 
connec-
tion, if in fact the intervening act was foreseeable as a not unlikely consequence
of the defendant's negligent conduct. Lane v. Atlantic Works (1872) 111 
Mass.
136; Brower si. N. Y. C. & H. Ry. (igi8) 91 N. J. Law i9o, 
1o3 At. 166. See
Jeremiah Smith, Legal Cause in Actions of Tort (1p11-i2) 25 HAMv. 
L. Rav. io3,
223, 303. The instant case may be sound in denying the plaintiff the damages 
he
asked, for the other reason given,--public policy,--but to say that the 
defendant's
negligence was not the proximate cause merely because the voluntary 
act of a third
person intervened, would in many cases be too lenient on a wrongdoer. 
The
decision may, perhaps, be explained as a'survival of the hidebound 
doctrine, to
which the English courts have adhered rather closely, that the original 
publisher
of defamation is not liable for the damage which results from an 
unauthorized
re-publication by'a third person. See Ward v. Weeks (183o, 
C. P.) 7 Bing. 211.
ToRTs-UNIONS-APPLiCATI1oN oF STATuTE To 
CLOSED SHoP STmK.-In a
jurisdiction where there was a statute in force denying 
the right to enjoin
strikers where the dispute was over "terms and conditions 
of employment," a
strike for a closed shop was called by the defendants in several 
factories. On
application for an injunction by the plaintiff the trial curt held 
that the statute
applied, and modified the preliminary order. Held (on other 
grounds), that
the appeal should not be granted, with a dictum that a strike for 
a closed shop did
not come within the statute. A. J. Monday Co. v. Automobile, 
Aircraft, &
Vehicle Workers of America, local no. 25 et al. (192o, Wis.) 177 N. W. 
867.
It is now well settled that a strike for an advance in wages, a reduction 
in
the hours of labor, or any other legitimate advantage, conducted 
in a lawful
manner and under such conditions as not to inflict injury wantonly 
or
maliciously on persons or property, is lawful. State v. Stockford 
(i9o4) 77
Conn. 227, 58 AtI. 769; Jersey City Printing Co. v. Cassidy (1902) 
63 N. J. Eq.
759, 53 AtI. 23o. Recent decisions have generally held that 
a closed shop is a
legitimate advantage, because it strengthens the union. Cohn & Roth Electric
Co. v. Brick Layers, Masons, & Plasterers local No. 1 (1917) 92 Conn. 16i, 
1o
Atl. 659; Bossert v. Dhuy (1917) 221 N..Y. 342, 117 N. E. 582. But 
on the
other hand a strike for this purpose was held illegal even before a statute 
in
Massachusetts, for, it was said, the primary object is to injure the 
employer
or non-union man and the purpose of strengthening the union is too remote.
Folsom v. Lewis (igii) 208 Mass. 336, 94 N. E. 316. And 
it has been held
that interference with an employer's right to employ whom he pleases 
cannot
be justified. E'dman vt. Mitchell (Ipo3) 207 Pa. 79, 5
6 Atl. 327. A strike for
a closed shop has been held to come under the Clayton Act, from 
which the
statute in the instant case is copied. Duplex Printing Press Co. t. Deering 
et al.
(19x8, C. C. A. 2d) 252 Fed. 722. Yet the Supreme Court of the United 
States
had said that a strike for a union mine was illegal and did not come under 
the
Clayton Act. See Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. vt. Mitchell (917) 245 U. S.
229, 38 Sup. Ct. 65, L. R. A. 1918 C, 497, note. But Justices Brandeis, 
Holmes,
and Clarke, dissented and recognized the advantage to the union and the 
lawful-
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ness of such a strike. See Cook, Privileges of Labor Unions in the Struggle
for Life (1918) 27 Y.AL LAW JOURNAL, 779; NoTmS (1918) 31 HARv. L. REv.
482, 648. In England a threatened strike over the employment of a man belong-
ing to another union was held to be a trade dispute within the meaning of
Trade Dispute Act of i9o6 (6 Edw. VII c. 47). White v. Riley and Wood
(092o, C. A.) 36 T. L. R. 849. It is suggested that the growing tendency
is to recognize the closed shop as a legitimate object of trade dispute and there-
fore that such statutes as that in the instant case should apply to a closed shop
strike. See COMMENTS (i920) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 790, 791.
TRUSTs-CHAR. ITAE UsE-PRIvATE BURrAL GRouN.-The plaintiff brought a
bill in equity to declare void, as violating the rule against perpetuities, a bequest
of shares of stock in.trust for the upkeep of a family burial ground. "Held, that
the. trust was void as a perpetuity, as it was not for a charitable use. Shippee v.
Industrial Trust Co. (192o, R. L) io At. 410.
In the absence of statute, a trust for the upkeep of a family or individual tomb
is usually held invalid, if it is to continue longer than the period of perpetuities.
Bird v. Lee [igoi] I Ch. 715; McCartney v. Jacobs (1gig) 288 Ill. 568, 123 N. E.
557; Van Syckel v. Johnson (1912) .o N. J. Eq. 117, 7o Atl. 657. Some few
courts have held, even at common law, that such a trust was valid. See Nauman
v. Weidman (1897) 182 Pa, 263, 265, 37 Atl. 863; Swasey v. American Bible
Society (1869) 57 Me. 523; overruled by Piper v. Moulton (1881) 72 Me. i55.
But, if the trust is for the upkeep of a public cemetery, or one attached to a
church, then it is for a charitable use, and is valid. Attorney General v. Lucas
[19o5] I Ch. 68; Chapman v. Newell (igio) 146 Iowa, 415, 125 N. W. 324; contra,
Van Syckel v. Johnson, supra. A trust to erect and maintain a monument to a
public character has been held valid. Gilner v. Gilmer (1868) 42 Ala. 9. Local
statutes in some states have rendered trusts similar to that in the instant case
enforceable. See Morse v. Naiick (igoo) 176 Mass. 510, 57 N. E. 996; Hewitt v.
Wheeler School & Library (igog) 82 Conn. 188, 72 At. 935; Driscoll v. Hewlett
(i9o9) 132 App. Div. 125, 116 N. Y. Supp. 466. It is submitted that further
statutory enactment validating such trusts is desirable. No depth of misfortune
or poverty can deprive one of the members of civilized society of the privilege
of having a grave, and a rule of law Which would deny a generous testator the
privilege of establishing a trust for such uses, and yet uphold a trust to pave the
street, build a bridge, etc., would lack the elements of both reason and consistency.
See Chapman v. Newell (i9io) 146 Iowa, 415, 421, 125 N. W. 324, 327.
TRUSTS-SAVINGS BANK DEPOSITS WITHOUT CESTUI'S KNOWLEDGE-DEATH OF
SETTLOR.-The defendant was administrator of the intestate estate of A. A had
made several deposits of her own money in various savings banks in the form
"A, trustee for B," in favor of the several petitioners, who received no notice
of the existence of such deposits until after A's death. The deposits were
increased at various times and in one case, withdrawals were made of some
of the accrued interest. Held, that a valid trust was created in favor of B
upon making such deposits. Cazallis v. Ingrahan (192o, Me.) iiO Atl. 359.
The Massachusetts court would have arrived at a contrary decision, since it
arbitrarily requires notice to the cestui to establish the trust. Cleveland v.
Hampden Savings Bank (1902) 182 Mass. IIo, 6s N. E. 27; Clark v. Clark
(1871) io8 Mass. 522. Other courts would not have found the necessary intent
to create an immediate, irrevocable, right in the cestui at the time of making
the deposit, on the facts of this case. Nicklas v. Parker (I9o7) 71 N. J. Eq.
777, 6I Atl. 267; Marcy v. Amazeen (1881) 61 N. H. 131. Under the doctrine
of "tentative trusts," the New York court by a different process of reasoning
would have arrived at the same conclusion as that in the principal case. Matter
of Totten (I9o4) 179 N. Y. 112, 71 N. E. 748; cf. Walso v. Latterner (1918)
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x4o Minn. 455, 168 N. W. 353. Although it is a clear departure from orthodox
theory, the doctrine of the Totten case possesses the virtue of most closely
approximating the true intent of the depositoi. It has been suggested that this
desirable result might be better attained by legislation. See Larremore, Judicial
Legislation in New York (i9o5) 14 YAIE LAw JouRNAiL, 315. But the courts
would then be so restricted to close interpretation as to make the legislation
abortive. The doctrine further affords a practical method for poor persons to
transmit property without a will. Of course, it is here in conflict with the
Statute of Wills. See Nicklas v. Parker (igoq) 71 N. J. Eq. 777, 61 AtI. 267.
Furthermore there is danger of its being applied to analogous cases. See (1905)
19 HAxv. L. REv. 207. The effect on inheritance taxation should also be con-
sidered. See (igig) 29 YALE LAw JouRNtAL, 465. Evidently Maine prefers to
be less practical and to remain orthodox.
WILLs-ExxcUTroRS AND ADmiNiSTRAToRS-STATTrE OF NoN-CLAir-No WAIE
By FRAuDULENT CoNDucT OF ADmiNisEAToL.-The plaintiff, relying on the assur-
ances of the administrator of a decedents estate that the presentation to him
of an itemized claim would be a compliance with the statute, failed to file her
claim with the probate court according to law, Proceedings were instituted to
review an order refusing to extend the time. Held, that the statute of non-claim
could not be waived by any conduct of the administrator, however fraudulent.
State ex rel. Scherber v. Probate Court of Hennepin County, et al. (192o, Minn.)
177 N. W. 354.
The decisions in the United States are almost uniform in holding that these
statutes of non-claim, that are so like statutes of limitations, are Imperative and
mandatory and cannot be waived or tolled by the personal representatives under
any circumstances. See 2 Schouler, Wills, Executors, and Administrators ( 5th
ed. 1915) sec. 139o; Wood, Limitation of Actions (4th ed. I916) sec. 188;
L. R. A. 1915 B, lo42, note; Security Trust Co. v. Black River National Bank
(1902) I87 U. S. 211, 23 Sup. Ct. 52; Abbott v. Johnson (1917) 13 Ark. 1, 195
S. W. 676. The same has been held as to the filing of claims for classification.
Spaulding v. Suss (877) 4 Mo. App. 541. The above cases differ from the instant
case in lacking the element of fraud, but there are dicta to the effect that not
even fraud could alter the iron-clad rule. See Nagle v. Ball (1893) 71 Miss. 330,
335, 13 So. 929, 930; Vanderpool v. Vanderpool (1914) 48 Mont. 448; 454, 138
Pac. 772, 774. In the cases under consideration, however, there is no such fraud
as should work an estoppel in any event, the misrepresentation being one of law
and the means of knowledge being equally accessible to the creditor and to the
administratdr. See Burdick, Torts (3d ed. 1913) sec. 449; Smith, Frauds (1907)
secs. 14, 247. The result is quite inconsistent with that in an overwhelming
majority of jurisdictions, allowing the personal representative to stop the run-
ning of the general statute, and with a decided authority to the effect that he
may also waive it after it has run. See L. R. A. 1915 B, ioi6, note. The dis-
tinction attempted by many courts-one of doubtful validity-is that the general
statute is a bar to the remedy and the special, to the right. See Branch Bank
at Decatur v. Hawkins (1848) 12 Ala. 755, 759; Rhodes v. Cannon (1914) 112
Ark. 6, 15, 164 S. W. 752, 754. But the statutes in some states allow the owners
of claims so barred to reach after-discovered assets, and this result would sug-
gest that the true explanation lies in the policy back of the statute of non-claim,
namely, the provision of a speedy 'and effective mcde of distribution of the
property of decedents, fair to all concerned. See Waughof v. Bartlett (1896)
165 Ill. 124, 128, 46 N. E. 197, 198; Vanderpool v. Vanderpool (1914) 48 Mont.
448, 454, 138 Pac. 772, 774, The instant case would seem to be quite sound in
requiring the creditor to safeguard his own interests by inquiring as to the law
from some authoritative source.
